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CEO Compensation and Stock Mispricing: How Do Boards React to Mutual Fund Flow-Driven Price Pressure?
SSRN Electronic Journal
2019
Abstract
We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards making economically efficiency decisions, we find that boards rely more on accounting and less on stock performance in setting CEO's cash compensation when stock prices are temporarily less informative. This finding is more pronounced for those firms with more experienced boards and those without precisely specified formulae for cash compensation, i.e., where boards have more discretion over performance-based compensation
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Details
- Title
- CEO Compensation and Stock Mispricing
- Creators
- Jie Cai - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- SSRN
- Resource Type
- Other
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Other Identifier
- 991020534924304721