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Do Acquirer CEO Incentives Impact Mergers?
SSRN Electronic Journal
2014
Abstract
This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the riskiness of CEO wealth increases (as measured by excess vega or cumulative option-based wealth), firms are more likely to become an acquirer, pay higher premiums, and experience lower post-merger performance. These results hold controlling for CEO overconfidence and cannot be attributed to firms altering incentives to induce CEOs to partake in mergers. Post financial crisis, we find both a shift in the composition of CEO pay and its relation to mergers. Overall, these results have important policy implications in the debate over optimal CEO pay as the structure by which CEOs are compensated appears to impact firm choices
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Details
- Title
- Do Acquirer CEO Incentives Impact Mergers?
- Creators
- David Becher - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- SSRN
- Resource Type
- Other
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Bennett S. LeBow College of Business; Finance; Drexel University
- Other Identifier
- 991019551687304721