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Preprint
Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
SSRN Electronic Journal
2003
Abstract
If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a quot;poison pillquot; by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby reducing the firm's attractiveness to a raider. Second, employees act as quot;white squiresquot; for the incumbent managers, lobbying against hostile takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent management. Our model is consistent with available empirical findings, and yields new predictions as well
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Details
- Title
- Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
- Creators
- Paolo F Volpin - Drexel University
- Publication Details
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- SSRN
- Resource Type
- Preprint
- Language
- German
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Other Identifier
- 991021862396104721