Computer Science - Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) is crucial for safe and correct driving
automation. Recent works revealed a general vulnerability of TSR models to
physical-world adversarial attacks, which can be low-cost, highly deployable,
and capable of causing severe attack effects such as hiding a critical traffic
sign or spoofing a fake one. However, so far existing works generally only
considered evaluating the attack effects on academic TSR models, leaving the
impacts of such attacks on real-world commercial TSR systems largely unclear.
In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale measurement of physical-world
adversarial attacks against commercial TSR systems. Our testing results reveal
that it is possible for existing attack works from academia to have highly
reliable (100\%) attack success against certain commercial TSR system
functionality, but such attack capabilities are not generalizable, leading to
much lower-than-expected attack success rates overall. We find that one
potential major factor is a spatial memorization design that commonly exists in
today's commercial TSR systems. We design new attack success metrics that can
mathematically model the impacts of such design on the TSR system-level attack
success, and use them to revisit existing attacks. Through these efforts, we
uncover 7 novel observations, some of which directly challenge the observations
or claims in prior works due to the introduction of the new metrics.
Metrics
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Title
Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack on Traffic Sign Recognition: A Commercial Systems Perspective