Seojin Kim

Why were incumbents able to pioneer and dominate the nascent bionic prosthetic industry, even though entrants represented the majority of the firms investing in this radical technology? To answer this question, our abductive study builds on the novel base principles definition and uses a historical approach to investigate the incubation and early commercialization periods (1974-2008) of bionic prosthetics. We use comprehensive quantitative data on all technological entrants and historical analysis of significant firms to reveal that organizational prehistory affects both the knowledge and intent of technological entrants. Start-ups, incumbents in conventional prosthetics, and established firms in other industries created and integrated subtechnologies into a radical system. Although all firms invested in component technologies, incumbents played a key role as system integrators. Incumbents dominated product commercialization; start-ups captured value through alliances or by being acquired, and established firms in other industries leveraged their knowledge in adjacent value chains as a function of their prior histories and intents. In comparing the virtues of our explanation-the creating radical systems effects-with widely accepted alternative explanations, we develop a more generalized framework of interorganizational dynamics in nascent industries as an endogenous, coevolutionary process that goes beyond explanations that privilege competitive dynamics to also include collaborative dynamics in value creation (and capture).

Research Summary We examine how and why pre‐existing vertical scope may cause differences in product market exit rates after sudden and exogenous decreases in demand. Our empirical context is the U.S. medical diagnostic imaging industry (2004–2009), wherein a major Medicare reform created a derived demand shock to equipment manufacturers. Using a difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference design, we find integrated firms were more likely to exit than nonintegrated firms. Building on the literature conceptualizing firms' pre‐shock vertical scope as a representation of existing resources and governance choices, we explain that integrated and nonintegrated firms responded differently by leveraging their own distinctive capabilities. Our qualitative insights suggest that higher market exit of integrated firms was driven by their higher adjustment costs due to frictions across strategies for demand management versus cost reduction. Managerial Summary This study investigates whether having a dedicated sales force or utilizing third‐party distributors can help mitigate the adverse effect of an abrupt demand decrease on manufacturers. In the context of the US medical imaging equipment industry affected by the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, we show that all firms implemented strategies for demand management, cost reduction, and product portfolio reconfiguration in response. Manufacturers using external distributors experienced fewer frictions across these strategies than those with an internal sales force and were less likely to exit. Thus, a firms' vertical scope can impact how they cope with environmental changes.

We examine how mission-oriented grand challenges-formed to address the public sector's unmet needs through development of new technologies and products for high potential impact-originate and catalyze industry incubation. Our analysis of six prominent cases identifies the incubation process, consisting of identification of unmet needs as a grand challenge, championing and articulation of a mission, leverage of private enterprise, and success or failure of the mission for subsequent industry emergence. The resulting conceptual model highlights key similarities and differences of industry incubation stemming from the public sector's mission-oriented grand challenges relative to industries triggered by scientific discoveries or unmet user needs where the public sector is not as salient. The analysis reveals successful outcomes are associated with the public sector's goal setting and carrying out "market functions" pertaining to selection, coordination, and knowledge sharing. We also provide cautions and caveats regarding fault lines that may arise in public-private partnerships.